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INTRODUCTION
Collateral estoppel' is a close relative of the doctrine of res
judicata. 2 Unlike res judicata which may be used to preclude
entire claims that were brought or should have been brought in
a prior action, 3 collateral estoppel only applies to issues actually
litigated.4 As courts have tried to bring finality and judicial
Collateral estoppel is often used interchangeably with "issue preclusion." See
Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 123 n.2 (Iowa 1981); Gregory v.
Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Ky. 1980). In the landmark case of Sedley v.
City of West Buechel, 461 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Ky. 1971), Kentucky's highest court referred
to collateral estoppel as the " 'preclusion' doctrine."
" 'Offensive collateral estoppel' refers to the successful assertion by a party
seeking affirmative relief, that a party to a prior adjudication who was unsuccessful on
a particular issue in that adjudication is barred from relitigating the issue in a subsequent
litigation." Callen, Efficiency After All: A Reply -to Professor Flanagan's Theory of
Offensive Collateral Estoppel, 1983 AIZ. ST. L.J. 799, 799 n.2. See also Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979) ("In this context, offensive use of
collateral estoppel occurs when the plaintiff seeks to foreclose the defendant from
litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in an action with
another party.").
2 See Note, Use of Juror Depositions to Bar Collateral Estoppel: A Necessary
Safeguard or Dangerous Precedent?, 34 VAND. L. REv 143, 144 (1981). But see Persch-
bacher, Rethinking Collateral Estoppel: Limiting the Preclusive Effect of Administrative
Determinations in Judicial Proceedings, 35 U. FLA. L. Rav. 422, 426-27 (1983) ("Despite
the current perception of collateral estoppel as a branch of res judicata, the two doctrines
have independent origins in Anglo-American law. This historical distinction is im-
portant, because it serves notice that the purposes and policies underlying res judicata
and collateral estoppel are not necessarily the same." (footnotes omitted)).
I See Egbert v. Curtis, 695 S.W.2d 123, 124 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985):
Stated another way the subsidiary rule makes res judicata applicable not
only to the issues disposed of in the first action, but to every point which
properly belonged to the subject of the litigation in the first action and
which in the exercise of reasonable diligence might have been brought
forward at that time.
Id., Catams, Access to the Federal Courts for Title VII Claimants in the Post-Kremer
Era: Keeping the Doors Open, 16 LoY. 209, 246 (1985).
1 See, e.g., Kaiser v. Northern States Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899, 907 (Minn.
1984) ("[Tlhe party seeking the benefit of collateral estoppel must show that during the
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economy into litigation, judicial acceptance of collateral estoppel
has increased greatly 5 In an attempt to exercise control over the
application of collateral estoppel, many jurisdictions distinguish
between offensive6 and defensive estoppe 7 and either reject the
use of offensive collateral estoppel or require stricter prerequi-
sites for its use.8
Kentucky courts have not expressly accepted the offensive
use of collateral estoppel. However, the last major obstacle to
its application was removed 9 when the mutuality requirement'0
was rejected in 1971 m Sedley v City of West Buechel." Since
the Sedley opinion, other jurisdictions have expressly adopted
offensive collateral estoppel. 2 This Note argues that the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court should follow their lead and expressly
former action the presently contested issue was actually litigated. "); Note, supra
note 2, at 145-46 ("A basic prerequisite to the application of collateral estoppel is that
the issue now involved is identical to the one previously litigated."); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) ("When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated
and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the par-
ties. ").
I See United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158-59 (1984); Parklane Hosiery
Co., 439 U.S. at 326 ("Collateral estoppel has dual purpose of protecting
litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his
privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation."); Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Umversity of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1971).
But see Perschbacher, supra note 2, at 451 ("The foregoing critique suggests courts'
regular reliance on the policies of finality, prevention of vexatious litigation, judicial
economy, and minimization of inconsistent decisions in applying collateral estoppel is
often misplaced.").
6 See supra note 1.
7 See Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 326 n.4 ("Defensive use occurs when a
defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from asserting a claim the plaintiff has previously
litigated and lost against another defendant.").
8 See infra notes 129-86 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text; cf. infra notes 134-35, 163-68
and accompanying text.
,0 Mutuality is the common law doctrine that prohibits the use of collateral estoppel
against a party unless the proponent of the doctrine would have been bound by a
contrary decision. Thus, collateral estoppel cannot be applied unless both parties are
bound by the prior decision. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc., 402 U.S. at 320-
21. Only a few states still require mutuality. Schroeder, Relitigation of Common Issues:
The Failure of Nonparty Preclusion and an Alternative Proposal, 67 IowA L. REv. 917,
919-20 (1982) (a 1981 list included nine states).
" 461 S.W.2d 556 (Ky. 1971).
12 See infra notes 157-86 and accompanying text.
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accept this doctrine. Although offensive collateral estoppel is not
without its critics, 3 the experience of other jurisdictions has
shown that proper controls can insure that the doctrine is applied
fairly 14
The Kentucky Supreme Court must make a clear and defin-
itive statement on offensive collateral estoppel for three reasons.
First, Kentucky practitioners need to know the effect of prior
litigated issues and who may take advantage of estoppel."5 Sec-
ond, recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions require federal courts
to apply state preclusion principles to prior state court judgments
and state admimstrative adjudications. 16 Third, as a general rule
other states look to Kentucky principles of collateral estoppel to
determine the effect of prior Kentucky judgments.17
This Note seeks to provide a framework for the application
of offensive collateral estoppel in Kentucky by comparing the
3 See generally Flanagan, The Efficiency Hypothesis and Offensive Collateral
Estoppel: A Response to Professor Callen, 1983 Aiz. ST. L.J. 835 (Professor Flanagan
responds to an attack on his 1982 article against offensive collateral estoppel); Flanagan,
Offensive Collateral Estoppel: Inefficiency and Foolish Consistency, 1982 ARiz. ST. L.J.
45; Perschbacher, supra note 2.
4 See generally infra notes 129-238 and accompanying text for cases that demon-
strate a successful application of the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel. When
technical compliance with estoppel requirements would cause an inequitable result, courts
have refused to apply collateral estoppel on grounds of unfairness or failure to fulfill
estoppel purposes. See infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
11 Without a clear statement of offensive collateral estoppel principles, attorneys
involved in multiple litigation are less able to predict the effect of a first decision on
later judgments. In addition, a clear statement on offensive collateral estoppel would
allow attorneys involved in multi-state litigation to predict the effect of allowing the
Kentucky litigation to proceed to judgment first.
16 See University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 106 S. Ct. 3220, 3227 (1986).
Accordingly, we hold that when a state agency "acting in a judicial capacity
resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties
have had an adequate opportunity to litigate," federal courts must give
the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it is entitled
in the State's courts.
Id. (citing United States v. Utah Constr. & Mimng Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966));
Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984) ("It is now
settled that a federal court must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect
as would be given that judgment under the law of the State in which the judgment was
rendered.").
11 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNmCT OF LAWS § 95 (1969) ("What issues
are determined by a valid judgment is determined, subject to constitutional limitations,
by the local law of the State where the judgment was rendered.").
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current treatment of collateral estoppel under Kentucky law with
the development of offensive collateral estoppel in other juris-
dictions. Defendants facing multiple lawsuits on identical issues
may consider offensive estoppel a deadly weapon when wielded
by subsequent plaintiffs. However, the protections currently ex-
isting under Kentucky law and additional protections recogmzed
in other jurisdictions can, in many cases, turn this deadly weapon
into a paper tiger.
I. APPLICATION IN KENTUCKY
A. History of Collateral Estoppel
The history of collateral estoppel in Kentucky may be divided
into three stages: The mutuality requirement existing before Sed-
ley, 18 the rejection of mutuality in Sedley, and estoppel following
Sedley
1. Before Sedley
Prior to Sedley collateral estoppel was viewed as a type of
res judicata. 19 In accord with res judicata, a prior judgment was
binding only if it was between the same parties or those in
privity with them. 20 In the 1963 decision of State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v Shelton,2' Kentucky's highest court
stated that "[t]he doctrine under which a person not a party to
a suit may be bound by a judgment therein is not strictly res
judicata but 'collateral estoppel.' "22 At that time, the term
"collateral estoppel" was merely a convement way to distinguish
preclusion between the same parties from preclusion based upon
privity 23 By 1965, collateral estoppel was interpreted to apply
Sedley v. City of West Buechel, 461 S.W.2d 556 (Ky. 1971).
See, e.g., Ward v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 436 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1968),
overruled on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 526 S.W.2d
820 (Ky. 1975); Whittenberg Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 390 S.W.2d
877 (Ky. 1965); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shelton, 368 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. 1963).
20 See Ward, 436 S.W.2d at 796-97; Shelton, 368 S.W.2d at 737.
2, 368 S.W.2d 734 (Ky. 1963).
2 Id. at 737.
" See id.
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to specific issues that had been determined in the prior action.24
Moreover, in 1968 the doctrine was said to deal "primarily"
with issues of fact and law between the same parties. 25
2. The Sedley Decision
Considering the confusion that existed in applying collateral
estoppel, it is probably no accident that the phrase "collateral
estoppel" is not even mentioned in Sedley Instead of "collateral
estoppel," the court adopted what it calls the " 'preclusion'
doctrine.' '26 Mrs. Sedley, the owner of defaulted revenue bonds,
attempted to obtain a limited recovery from the City of West
Buechel, Kentucky 27 In two prior actions in federal court, Mrs.
Sedley was one of three defendants in suits brought by two life
insurance companies to recover the value of the bonds.2 Al-
though the federal cases were settled when Mrs. Sedley agreed
to reacquire a portion of the bonds from the insurance compa-
nies, an interlocutory order was appealed and became final
following a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision. 29 That order
contained a finding that the bonds were not issued according to
law and were therefore invalid. In the subsequent case the
defendant city moved to dismiss the claim on grounds of res
judicata because the prior case had determined that the bonds
were invalid. This motion was granted by the trial court.3 0
Since the federal judge had stated that the finding of bond
invalidity was immaterial to his decision,3 the Kentucky Court
, See Whittenberg Eng'g & Constr. Co., 390 S.W.2d at 883 ("[Ihe judgment in
the prior action did not operate as a bar under the doctrine of res judicata or act as an
estoppel on the issue of negligence under the corollary doctrine of collateral estoppel by
judgment " (emphasis added)).
25 Ward, 436 S.W.2d at 796 ("Collateral estoppel applies to situations where res
judicata is not applicable, primarily a different case between the same parties with either,
(I) factual determinations ansing out of the same situation, or (2) closely similar
questions of law.").
21 Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 559. The omission of the phrase "collateral estoppel"
may have led to the failure of recent Kentucky Court of Appeals decisions to properly
define the doctrine. See infra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
27 See Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 557.
21 Id. at 558.
29 Id.
I0 d. at 557.
1, Id. at 558.
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could have ended its opinion by declaring that there was no res
judicata because the prior finding was not essential to the judg-
ment.3 2 However, the court went further and used this case as
an opportunity to make a major change in the law of collateral
estoppel and res judicata in Kentucky Although the City of
West Buechel was not a party to any of the prior cases involving
Mrs. Sedley, the "preclusion doctrine" was adopted. 33 The mu-
tuality requirement was rejected, yet -not a single prior Kentucky
case requiring identity of the parties34 was expressly overruled.
Instead, prior cases were rejected implicitly by a new doctrine
recognized in a single sentence: "The 'preclusion' doctrine seems
reasonable to us and we shall adopt it."'35
After this dramatic new doctrine was adopted, however, the
court refused to apply it to the case before it because serious
factual questions remained as to whether the finding of invalidity
of the bonds was essential to the prior judgment and whether
the parties had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. 36
The court stated that there was less basis for a full and fair
opportunity to litigate where a party was a defendant in the
prior action. 37 Mrs. Sedley had been a defendant in the prior
In the [prior] action the opimon of the district court indicates that a
determination of the issue of whether the bond issue was invalid was
considered to be immaterial to a determination of the plaintiff's right of
recovery, and the court granted judgment to the plaintiff without deter-
mining whether or not the bonds were invalid.
Id.
32 See id. at 558-59. After discussing the need for the issue to be essential to the
prior judgment, and that the judge in the prior action did not find it essential, the court
stated that "[t]he ultimate significance of this point, as affects the disposition of the
instant appeal, will be discussed at a later point in this opinion." Id. at 558. Thus, the
court deliberately set out to announce the abolition of the mutuality requirement and
the adoption of the "preclusion doctrine," although it could have refused to apply
collateral estoppel on other grounds. See id.
11 Id. at 559.
, See, e.g., Ward, 436 S.W.2d at 796 ("Collateral estoppel applies to situations
where res judicata is not applicable, primarily a different case between the same par-
ties. "). State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 368 S.W.2d at 737 ("[Collateral estoppel]
is based upon privity between a party to the onginal suit and the person who should be
bound by the judgment. This privity is in turn founded upon such an identity of interest
that the party to the judgment represented the same legal right.").
11 Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 559.
36 Id.
37 Id.
[VOL. 76
OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
action, but the court did not give this factor controlling weight
since the case was remanded to the trial court to determine the
factual preclusion questions.38
What new and dramatic doctrine was adopted in Sedley9
The court in Sedley adopted non-mutual collateral estoppel or
issue preclusion that applies when at least the party to be bound
is the same party or in privity with a party in the prior action.39
Although the use of collateral estoppel in Sedley was defensive, 40
the court did not prohibit an offensive application. However,
the court used confusing phraseology by referring to the doctrine
as " 'claim preclusion' or 'issue preclusion.' "41 The term "claim
preclusion" refers to the res judicata effect given to an entire
claim while "issue preclusion" refers to the collateral estoppel
of a party from relitigating an issue that has already been
deternned. 42
3. Post-Sedley
Following the Sedley decision, the Kentucky Supreme Court
clarified the doctrine of collateral estoppel, 41 while the Kentucky
Court of Appeals somewhat confused the doctrine.44 In Gregory
v Commonwealth,45 the Kentucky Supreme Court cited Sedley
11 Id. at 560. In cases involving offensive collateral estoppel, the party resisting
preclusion typically was a defendant in the prior action. See, e.g., infra notes 148-69.
This author sees little reason for refusing to apply collateral estoppel on the basis of
this factor. The express adoption of offensive collateral estoppel in many jurisdictions
should alert any defendant facing multiple litigation of the potential use of estoppel
should the defendant lose the first case. Cf. infra notes 148-69 and accompanying text.
11 See Gregory v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 598, 600 (Ky. 1980); Sedley, 461
S.W.2d at 559.
40 The City of West Buechel, the defendant in the subsequent action, attempted
to defensively use the bond validity issue to prevent Mrs. Sedley, the plaintiff in the
subsequent action, from relitigating this issue. See Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 557.
41 Id. at 559.
42 See Perschbacher, supra note 2, at 423 n.8 ("Modern approaches usually treat
collateral estoppel (also known as 'issue preclusion') and res judicata (also known as
'claim preclusion') together as two aspects of the effect of pnor adjudication on sub-
sequent litigation." (citations omitted)); Gregory, 610 S.W.2d at 600.
41 See generally, Gregory, 610 S.W.2d at 598.
" See generally, Waddell v. Stevenson, 683 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984);
Penco, Inc. v. Detrex Chem. Indus., Inc., 672 S.W.2d 948 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984); Fayette
County Educ. Ass'n v. Hardy, 626 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
4 610 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. 1980).
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for the proposition that "[c]ollateral estoppel, or issue preclu-
sion, is part of the concept of res judicata and serves to prevent
parties from relitigating issues necessarily determined in a prior
proceeding.' '46 In Gregory, a criminal defendant attempted to
bind the Commonwealth on the issue of sodomy commission. 47
In a prior dependency proceeding, a district court found that
the defendant had not subjected his children to deviate sexual
intercourse. However, the district court found other reasons to
commit the children to the Department of Human Resources.
As a result, the issue of sodomy commission was not essential
to the dependency judgment and could not serve to collaterally
estop the Commonwealth from relitigating the issue in the crim-
inal proceedings .48
The Gregory decision is important because it defines collat-
eral estoppel as res judicata which precludes relitigation of issues
necessarily decided in the prior action. This definition of collat-
eral estoppel conforms more closely with the definition found in
other jurisdictions. 49 Although the application of collateral es-
toppel in Gregory involved the same parties which had litigated
in the prior action (Gregory and the state), Sedley permits its
application where only one party is the same.50
At least three Kentucky Court of Appeals decisions mention
collateral estoppel without any recognition of the abandonment
of mutuality In Fayette County Education Association v
Hardy,5' the appellant teacher organization asserted that the
subsequent proceeding was barred by res judicata and estoppel.5 2
The court refused to decide this issue because it did not have a
sufficient record of the prior action to determine the parties and
issues involved. 53 However, the court implied that the appellant
would have to show that the same parties were involved in the
prior suit: "Thus we do not have the means to determine the
issue whether the circuit court allowed that action to be pursued
" Id. at 600.
41 Id. at 599.
" Id. at 600.
1' See supra note 42.
:1 Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 557-59.
- 626 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
12 Id. at 218.
,1 Id. at 219-20.
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as a class action involving the same parties as in this case."15 4
Similarly, in Penco, Inc. v Detrex Chemical Industries, Inc.,"
the court stated that "under the doctrine of collateral estoppel,
a judgment on the merits in a prior action, involving the same
parties or their privies, precludes the relitigation of issues ac-
tually litigated and determined in a prior suit regardless of
whether it is based on the same cause of action."' 56 Although
the court applied collateral estoppel by finding an "identity of
interest' 57 between the parties, the continued recognition of a
mutuality requirement failed to consider the impact of Sedley
In Waddell v Stevenson,58 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
again overlooked Sedley by stating that "a judgment becomes
res judicata only when there exist identity of the parties, identity
of the cause of action, and when the action is decided on its
merits." 5 9 The Waddell statement is correct if applied to claim
preclusion, but not to issue preclusion.60 The court cites the 1963
Shelton case6' and apparently defines collateral estoppel as res
judicata based upon privity 62 This is not the definition of col-
lateral estoppel found in Sedley, Gregory, or in other jurisdic-
tions .63
As these cases show, collateral estoppel or issue preclusion
has not been clearly distinguished from res judicata. In addition,
no attempt has been made to distinguish between offensive and
defensive collateral estoppel. However, recent Kentucky cases
involving res judicata provide a format for the requirements and
exceptions to the application of offensive collateral estoppel, and
demonstrate that adequate protections exist to prevent unfair or
inequitable application of offensive collateral estoppel.64
11 Id. at 220 (emphasis added). The court cited six cases relating to res judicata
and collateral estoppel, yet failed to cite Sedley or even suggest that mutuality vas no
longer required. Id. at 219-20.
55 672 S.W.2d 948 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
16 Id. at 950 (emphasis in original).
57 Id.
5 683 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
51 Id. at 958 (emphasis added).
60 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
61 368 S.W.2d 734.
62 Waddell, 683 S.W.2d at 959.
61 See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
", See infra notes 65-128 and accompanying text.
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B. Requirements of Collateral Estoppel
Fear of possible unfair application of offensive collateral
estoppel should be put to rest quickly when all the various
requirements and exceptions are considered. These protections
will be examined in two parts. First, Kentucky cases involving
collateral estoppel and res judicata provide a basic skeleton.
Second, the experience of other jurisdictions in the application
of offensive collateral estoppel adds the meat to provide a com-
plete body of law useful for both asserting and defending against
the application of the doctrine.
The six basic requirements of non-mutual collateral estoppel
are set forth in Sedley" 1) a final decision on the merits; 2)
identity of issues; 3) issues actually litigated and determined; 4)
a necessary issue; 5) a prior losing litigant; and 6) a full and
fair opportunity to litigate. 65 First, collateral estoppel requires a
final decision on the merits in the prior action. 66 "Finality of
decision is a prerequisite to the defense of res judicata and
collateral estoppel." 67 In Sedley and Cartmell v Urban Renewal
and Community Development Agency,68 the use of preclusion
was attacked because the prior issues allegedly were contained
in interlocutory orders. 69 Although the prior action was not a
final judgment, this attack failed in Sedley because the Sixth
Circuit accepted an appeal of the order as " 'a final adjudication
of that issue.' "70 However, the attack in Cartmell was successful
because the prior action involved only an interlocutory condem-
riation order. 71
11 Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 558-59.
6 Id. at 558; Cartmell v. Urban Renewal and Community Dev. Agency, 419
S.W.2d 719, 721-22 (Ky. 1967).
67 Cartmell, 419 S.W.2d at 721.
419 S.W.2d 719 (Ky. 1967).
69 Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 558; Cartmell, 419 S.W.2d at 721.
70 Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 558.
" See Cartmell, 419 S.W.2d at 721-22. As to the type of action in this case (a
condemnation proceeding), Cartmell may no longer have any application. A more recent
decision found that the condemnee has an immediate right to appeal even though the
condemnation order is called an " 'interlocutory' judgment." See also Ratliff v. Fiscal
Court of Caldwell Cty., Ky., 617 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Ky. 1981). If an interlocutory condem-
nation order may be final for purposes of appeal, it also may be final for purposes of
collateral estoppel. Id.
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Second, collateral estoppel requires identity of the issues in
the prior and subsequent actions. 72 Before the trial court or
court of appeal can determine the identity of issues, it must have
access to the complete record. 73 In Fayette County Education
Association v Hardy,74 a teachers' organization attempted to
use the claim or issues decided in a prior judgment, which had
allowed collective bargaining, to bind relitigation in the subse-
quent action.75 However, the complaint and judgment were the
only record of the prior case furnished to the Kentucky Court
of Appeals. As a result, the appellate court was unable to
identify the particular issues involved and refused to rule on the
preclusion question.76
Identity of the issues may be shown by a complete record
which includes a prior unpublished opinion. Under Kentucky
Rule of Civil Procedure 76.28(c), an unpublished opinion cannot
be "used as authority in any other case." ' 77 In Penco the appel-
lant attacked the use of a prior unpublished opinion for purposes
of res judicata and collateral estoppel as an attempt to use it
"as authority" in the present action.78 The court rejected this
argument stating that "[w]e do not construe the Rule so strictly
as to characterize the instant action as a separate 'other'
case. ))79
7 See BTC Leasing, Inc. v. Martin, 685 S.W.2d 191, 197 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984);
Penco, Inc., 672 S.W.2d at 951-52; Fayette County Educ. Ass'n, 626 S.W.2d at 219-20;
Norrell v. Elec. & Water Plant Bd., 557 S.W.2d 900, 902-03 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977);
Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 559; Whittenberg Eng'g & Constr. Co., 390 S.W.2d at 883.
11 See Fayette County Educ. Ass'n, 626 S.W.2d at 219-20.
- 626 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
75 rd.
76 See Id.
,7 "Opinions that are not to be published shall not be cited or used as authority
in any other case in any other court of this state." Ky. R. Cwy P 76.28(c) [hereinafter
CR 76.28(c)].
7' See Penco, Inc., 672 S.W.2d at 951.
71 Id. Because Penco involved mutuality of the parties, the question remains
whether Kentucky courts would apply this reasomng to the non-mutual use of collateral
estoppel in which only one party was involved in the prior unpublished opinion. The
result should be the same. Trial court opinions are not published, yet they are used as
authority for purposes of res judicata and collateral estoppel when a final decision is
rendered. Cf. supra notes 19-76 and accompanying text (most of the aforementioned
cases involved use of a trial court decision). Unpublished Kentucky Court of Appeals
decisions should have no less authority.
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Third, collateral estoppel is restricted to issues that were
actually litigated and determined in the prior action.80 "The
party asserting the application of the doctrine of collateral es-
toppel must plead and prove that the question presented in the
instant action was actually litigated and determined by the judg-
ment in the prior action.""' In Whittenberg Engineering & Con-
struction Co. v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,82 a general
contractor attempted to use collateral estoppel to bind the insurer
of a subcontractor's employees on the issue of the general con-
tractor's negligence.83 However, in the prior action the general
contractor was granted a summary judgment on the basis of a
Workmen's Compensation statute. Because the negligence issue
was not litigated in the prior action, it was not available in the
subsequent action for purposes of collateral estoppel.84
Fourth, the issue must have been necessary or essential to
the determination of the prior decision to estop relitigation in a
subsequent case.85 The Court in Sedley and Gregory denied the
use of issue preclusion mainly because the prior court failed to
rely upon the particular issue in reaching its decision. 6
The remaining two requirements focus on the fairness of
enforcing finality Fifth, even though absolute mutuality is no
longer required, at least the party to be bound must have been
a party to the prior action or in privity with a party to the prior
case. 87 An attempt to use a prior litigated issue against a party
s0 See Norrell, 557 S.W.2d at 902-03; Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 558; Whittenberg
Eng'g & Constr. Co., 390 S.W.2d at 883.
Whittenberg Eng'g & Constr. Co., 390 S.W.2d at 883.
390 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. 1965).
" Id. at 883.
See id.
* See Gregory, 610 S.W.2d at 600; Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 558.
16 See supra notes 31-32, 46-49 and accompanying text.
The general rule is that a judgment in a former action operates as an
estoppel only as to matters which were necessarily involved and determined
in the former action, and is not conclusive as to matters which were
immaterial or unessential to the determination of the prior action or which
were not necessary to uphold the judgment.
Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 558.
7 Waddell, 683 S.W.2d at 958; Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 559; State Farm Mut. Auto
Ins. Co., 368 S.W.2d at 737.
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who has never had an opportumty to litigate that issue is a
violation of due process.88
A typical traffic accident case illustrates the application of
this requirement. A truck collides with a car and a passenger in
the car sues the truck driver for injuries received. The truck
driver's defense is that the driver of the car was the proximate
cause of the accident. In a prior action the driver of the car,
who was not injured, recovered from the truck driver for exten-
sive damage to his car The jury verdict included a special finding
that the driver of the car was not negligent. As a result, the
passenger moves for a partial summary judgment on the issue
of liability If the motion is granted, the doctrine of offensive
collateral estoppel will be applied.
Taking the car accident hypothetical one step further, if the
truck driver had been found to be not negligent in the prior
case, the truck driver could not use this finding to collaterally
estop the passenger from suing him in the subsequent case be-
cause the passenger never had his day in court. Although it has
been argued that preclusion should apply in this situation,89 the
requirement that at least the party to be bound must have been
a party to the prior action or in privity with such a party allows
a party to have his day in court before he can be bound. 90 Thus,
when issues are expected to be the subject of more than one
action, a loss in the first action may bind the losing litigant in
a subsequent action. A plaintiff's loss in one case may result in
the application of defensive collateral estoppel by a different
defendant in a subsequent case, while a loss by a defendant may
result in the application of offensive collateral estoppel by a
different plaintiff in a subsequent case. 9t
1 See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979); Hansberry v.
Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940); Bruton & Crawford, Collateral Estoppel and Trial Strategy,
7 LrrIGATON 30, 30 (Summ. 1981).
0 See generally, Schroeder, supra note 9.
90 Of course when there is privity between two parties, one party may be bound
even though he was not a party to the first case. See Waddell, 683 S.W.2d at 958; State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 368 S.W.2d at 737.
" In this context, offensive use of collateral estoppel occurs when the plaintiff
seeks to foreclose the defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has
previously litigated unsuccessfully in an action with another party. Defen-
sive use occurs when a defendant seeks to prevent a plaintiff from asserting
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Sixth, collateral estoppel applies only if the party to be bound
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior
action. 92 This element requires the trial court to examine the
record and circumstances surrounding the prior action for any
conditions that may have prevented the party from adequately
litigating an issue. 93 In Sedley, the fact that Mrs. Sedley was a
defendant in the prior action was a factor for the trial court to
consider upon remand in determimng whether there had been a
full and fair opportumty to litigate the issue involved. 94 How-
ever, the appellate court allowed the City of West Buechel to
file an answer upon remand reasserting res judicata. Thus, the
use of collateral estoppel against a defendant does not, by itself,
indicate the lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate. 95
C. Exceptions to the Use of Collateral Estoppel
Although Sedley did not list any specific exceptions to the
application of collateral estoppel, the exceptions already avail-
able within the doctrine of res judicata provide additional pro-
tection against an unfair application of offensive collateral
estoppel. The following is not an exhaustive list of exceptions
to the application of res judicata available under Kentucky law
However, these exceptions may prevent the application of col-
lateral estoppel, as well as res judicata.
First, preclusion may be denied when the court in the prior
action was without subject matter jurisdiction. 96 In Karamt v
a claim the plaintiff has previously litigated and lost against another
defendant.
Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 326 n.4.
See Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 559.
The rule contemplates that the court in which the plea of res judicata
is asserted shall inquire whether the judgment in the former action was in
fact rendered under such conditions that the party against whom res
judicata is pleaded had a realistically full and fair opportunity to present
his case.
Id.
9 Id. See infra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
14 Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 559-60.
91 See id; see also supra note 38.
16 See Karami v. Roberts, 706 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Ky. Ct. App. 1986); Fischer v.
Jefferies, 697 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985). But see Kirchner v. Riherd, 702
S.W.2d 33, 35 (Ky. 1985). In Kirchner an injured driver proceeded first against the
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Roberts,97 the appellant and his father attempted to prevent the
appellant's former wife from setting aside a love and affection
conveyance by pleading the prior divorce decree as res judicata. 9
However, the decree expressly stated that the property in ques-
tion was not owned by the couple. The trial court in the divorce
action had no jurisdiction over property that was not claimed
by either party and its findings could not preclude the litigation
of ownership in the present action. 99 "If the court rendering a
judgment pleaded in bar did not have jurisdiction of the subject
matter or the parties to the action, the rule of res adjudicata
has no application, for it is an ineffective adjudication."10°
In Fischer v Jeffries,'°' the appellees argued that a probate
proceeding in district court was res judicata as to the validity of
a will.'0 2 However, since a district court has jurisdiction over
only uncontested probate matters,103 and the will had been chal-
lenged by the appellee children of the testator, the district court
did not have jurisdiction over the will, and its decision was not
effective for purposes of preclusion.' 4
Second, fraud and duress in the prior proceeding may pre-
vent the application of collateral estoppel. In Karami, duress in
the divorce proceeding was a ground for not applying res judi-
cata in a subsequent proceeding.' 5 Even if jurisdiction had ex-
isted over the property in question, the husband's physical
driver of the other car in the small claims division of district court, which had a
jurisdictional limit of $1000, to recover for property damages to his car. Id. at 33. After
losing on the issue of negligence in the small claims division, the injured driver filed suit
in Circuit Court to recover for his personal injuries. However, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky agreed with the trial court in dismissing the second suit for splitting a cause
of action. Id. at 35. A vigorous dissent written by Justice Leibson and joined by two
other justices challenged this decision on the basis of exceptions to the doctrine of issue
preclusion. Id. at 35-37 (Leibson, J., dissenting). With the different procedures and
jurisdiction in small claims court, the injured driver should not be precluded from
litigating negligence in the second action. Id.
1, Karami, 706 S.W.2d at 843.
Id. at 845.
See id.
1'0 Id. (quoting Wolfe County v. Tolsen, 140 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1940)).
101 697 S.W.2d 159 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985).
10 Id. at 160.
,01 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 24A.120(2), 394.240(1) (Baldwin 1986).
, See id.
See Karami, 706 S.W.2d at 846.
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violence and threats rendered the decree void for purposes of
res judicata. 0 6 Although the defense of duress in this instance
was made to prevent the application of res judicata to an agreed
judgment, 107 claims of fraud and duress should be available as
an exception under non-mutual collateral estoppel in light of the
requirement of a full and fair opportunity to litigate. 0s
Third, collateral estoppel is not available when there has
been a statutory or common law change in the legal climate
between the prior and subsequent judgments. 0 9 In Hall v. Noplis,"0
individual taxpayers challenged salary payments to Perry County
magistrates."' The magistrates pled as res judicata a December
17, 1985 Perry Circuit Court decision permitting such salary
payments. However, on December 11, 1959, Kentucky's highest
court had issued an oinion denying salary payments to Harlan
County magistrates. The court refused to allow the 1958 judg-
ment to preclude the subsequent action. The court reasoned that
the intervemng decision had altered the legal basis of the prior
judgment." 2 Thus, the earlier Perry County judgment was available
for purposes of res judicata only until December 11, 1959.'1'
Fourth, Kentucky courts have refused to apply preclusion
when principles of fairness would be violated by its applica-
tion." 4 When res judicata is demed on this ground, courts have
referred to the application of res judicata as "fundamentally
106 Id.
117 Id. at 845-46 ("A prior agreed judgment operates as res judicata in a subsequent
action only if free from fraud or duress.").
101 See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
,09 See Ward, 436 S.W.2d at 797 ("[M]any courts have held that estoppel should
apply unless there was an interim change in the 'legal climate' either through a change
in an applicable statute or through an intenm court decision." (citations omitted)); Hall
v. Noplis, 367 S.W.2d 456, 457-58 (Ky. 1963).
367 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1963).
Id. at 457.
, See id. at 458 ("But it would hardly be in keeping with sound policy to say that
an erroneous judgment must or can fix in perpetuity the rights and liabilities of parties
in such a continuing relationship as exists between the public and its officers.").
11 Id.
I" See Karami, 706 S.W.2d at 846; BTC Leasing, Inc., 685 S.W.2d at 198; Ward,
436 S.W.2d at 797.
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unfair, 1"5 "manifest injustice,""11 6 and "inequitable.' 1 7 In Kar-
ami, the prior divorce proceeding was described as "unfair" in
light of the husband's threats." 8 In Ward v Southern Bell Tele-
phone and Telegraph Co.,119 a telephone company sued the state
highway commission seeking compensation for the removal of
certain telephone lines along a state highway right-of-way 120 The
telephone company asserted that the state was collaterally es-
topped on the issue of compensation because the state had lost
in a prior action involving a different contract in another
county 121 After considering such factors as the different con-
tracts involved in each action, the different government attorneys
involved in each action, and the perpetual relationship between
utility companies and the state, the court found it "inequitable"
to apply estoppel. 2 2
In BTC Leasing, Inc. v Martin,23 the court stated that
"general considerations of fairness have led us to conclude that
it would be entirely inappropriate to apply the doctrine of res
judicata."''  In a Russell County action a repairman sought to
enforce a statutory lien against a successor in title to a house-
boat. The new owner had made every effort to ascertain any
existing liens against the boat while the repairman had failed to
give proper notice of his lien. 25 Nevertheless, the repairman
asserted that the new owner was bound by a prior action in
Wayne County where the court had found a valid lien and the
predecessor liable for repairs. 26 After finding a lack of privity
between the new owner and the parties in the prior action, the
court referred to res judicata as a "rule of justice ' 12 7 that should
not be applied to preclude an innocent purchaser, who made
Karamit, 706 S.W.2d at 846.
,' BTC Leasing, Inc., 685 S.W.2d at 198.
Ward, 436 S.W.2d at 797.
"' Karami, 706 S.W.2d at 846.
119 436 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1968).
' Id. at 795.
,' Id. at 796.
See id. at 797.
r 685 S.W.2d 191 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
11 Id. at 197.
M Id. at 196-97.
' Id. at 192-93.
'" Id. at 198.
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every reasonable effort to ascertain any prior interest, in favor
of a repairman who has done little to protect his interest.'2
A basic skeleton for the application of offensive collateral
estoppel presently exists in Kentucky The unfair application of
collateral estoppel is prevented by the prerequisites and excep-
tions to its application. Moreover, the experience of other juns-
dictions in the application of offensive collateral estoppel may
supply additional protections.
II. APPLICATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. History of Collateral Estoppel
While collateral estoppel has Germanic origins, 29 the doc-
trine in America was not distinguished clearly from res judicata
until Cromwell v County of Sac.130 This 1876 United States
Supreme Court decision has continued importance today because
of its focus on the need for actual litigation in the prior action
and the unique "elements and emphasis" of each suit.'3' How-
ever, expansion of collateral estoppel was hindered by such cases
as Triplett v Lowell,3 2 in which the court required mutuality as
a prerequisite to the application of collateral estoppel 33 Expan-
sion began again in 1942 when the California Supreme Court
rejected the mutuality requirement in Bernhard v Bank of Amer-
ica.134 Although Bernhard involved the defensive use of collateral
estoppel, nothing in the opinion barred an offensive use of
128 Id.
329 See Pershbacher, supra note 2, at 426-27.
3 94 U.S. 351 (1876); see Pershbacher, supra note 2, at 429.
Pershbacher, supra note 2, at 429 (citing Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 353-56, 359-60).
332 297 U.S. 638, 644 (1936), overruled, 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
13 See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313, 320-21 (1971) ("Triplett v. Lowell exemplified the judge-made doctrine of mutuality
of estoppel, ordaining that unless both parties (or their pnvies) in a second action are
bound by a judgment in a previous case, neither party (nor his privy) in the second
action may use the prior judgment as determinative of an issue in the second action.").
'- 122 P.2d 892,-895 (Cal. 1942). In addition, Bernhard is important because it
sets forth three questions to be answered before applying collateral estoppel: "Was the
,issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in
question? Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party against whom the
plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?" Id.
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preclusion. 35 The modem history of collateral estoppel revolves
around the Supreme Court's 1979 landmark decision in Parklane
Hosiery Co. v Shore.136
1. Estoppel Before Parklane
Mutuality was rejected in the federal courts in Blonder-
Tonque Laboratories, Inc. v University of Illinois Founda-
tion. 37 As in Bernhard, Blonder-Tonque involved only the de-
fensive use of collateral estoppel. 138 After rejecting mutuality,
some state courts limited collateral estoppel to only defensive
applications. 39 The doctrine appeared less fair when applied in
favor of a plaintiff in the subsequent action against a party who
was a defendant in both the prior and subsequent actions. 4
Later cases adopting the offensive use of collateral estoppel
attempted to remedy this concern by imposing additional re-
quirements upon such use.' 4' However, cases that imtially re-
jected mutuality such as Blonder-Tonque, Bernhard, and Sedley
already contained some of these additional protections.
M See Note, supra note 2, at 148 ("Although Bernhard involved defensive use of
collateral estoppel, Justice Traynor wrote his opinion broadly enough to encompass both
offensive and defensive situations.").
M3 439 U.S. 322 (1979); see infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
137 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
13, See id. at 330.
'" See Note, supra note 2, at 148-49.
Several courts, however, began developing a number of limitations to
the Bernhard decision, the most significant being the limitation of the
abrogation of mutuality to defensive use of collateral estoppel. This limi-
tation prevented unsuccessful litigants from returning to the courtroom
simply by switching opponents and promoted consolidation of litigation at
the outset. State courts generally adhered to the defensive use limitation,
whereas federal courts were more willing to allow nonparties to prior
actions to assert the collateral estoppel doctnne offensively.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also State ex rel. O'Blennis v. Adolf, 691 S.W.2d 498, 502
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) ("The cases reflect that courts have traditionally been less inclined
to allow offensive use of the doctrine than its defensive use when mutuality of estoppel
is absent.").
'4 Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 329-31. Parklane lists a number of special
problems involving offensive estoppel, including a "wait and see" attitude of potential
plaintiffs and inconsistent verdicts. Most state courts that have rejected mutuality now
attempt to solve these problems by requiring a case-by-case examination of factors such
as a "full and fair opportunity to litigate." Note, supra note 2, at 149-50 (a list of eight
factors).
14' See infra notes 148-238 and accompanying text.
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Both Blonder-Tonque and Bernhard emphasize the need for
the trial court to consider all the circumstances involved in the
prior and subsequent actions before precluding any issues. 142
"[A]s so often is the case, no one set of facts, no one collection
of words or phrases, will provide an automatic formula for
proper rulings on estoppel pleas. In the end, decision will nec-
essarily rest on the trial courts' sense of justice and equity ,,143
A fair application of collateral estoppel, both defensive and
offensive, is not achieved by simply meeting certain basic re-
quirements. The trial court may find additional factors in a
particular case justifying a denial of estoppel. 144 Moreover, both
Sedley and Blonder-Tonque require that the bound party have
had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the issue in the
prior action. 145 According to at least one commentator, the "full
and fair opportunity" rule was not applied by any state court
until 1967 146 The first state court to apply this rule permitted a
plaintiff to use collateral estoppel offensively in a subsequent
action. 147
2. The Parklane Decision
The Supreme Court made a definitive statement regarding
offensive collateral estoppel in Parklane Hosiery Co. v Shore.148
Two actions arose out of an alleged materially false and mis-
leading proxy statement issued in the context of a corporate
merger 149 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
brought an action against Parklane Hosiery for violation of
federal security laws, and the stockholders brought a separate
class action to recover damages. The SEC action resulted in a
judgment against the defendant, and the stockholders moved for
142 See supra note 131 and accompanying text; Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.,
402 U.S. at 333-34.
"I Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc., 402 U.S. at 333-34.
144 See supra notes 96-128 and accompanying text.
"I See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,
Inc., 402 U.S. at 333-34.
146 See Note, supra note 2, at 149 (citing B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 225 N.E.2d
195 (N.Y. 1967)).
141 Id. (citing B.R. DeWitt, Inc., 225 N.E.2d at 199).
14- 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
14 Id. at 324.
[VOL. 76
OFFENSIVE CoLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
partial summary judgment on the issue of whether the statement
was materially false and misleading.150 The court held that Park-
iane Hosiery was collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue
and affirmed the granting of the motion. 51 Although Parklane
permits the use of offensive collateral estoppel, the court noted
that two problems with its use distinguish offensive from defen-
sive use of preclusion. First, offensive use of collateral estoppel
does not necessarily promote judicial economy because potential
plaintiffs may sit on the sidelines awaiting a favorable decision
by another plaintiff against a common defendant.152 Second, the
doctnne may be unfair to a defendant if the prior suit was only
for a small amount of damages, inconsistent verdicts were in-
volved, or the defendant lacked adequate procedural opportu-
nities in the prior action. 5 1
The Court provided a solution to the inequitable nature of
offensive estoppel by listing at least seven factors that could
prevent its use: 1) the broad discretion of the trial court in the
application of offensive collateral estoppel; 2) lack of procedures
in the prior action that were available in the subsequent action;
3) an inconvenient forum in the prior action; 4) the possibility
that the plaintiff could easily have joined in the prior action; 5)
the bound party's lack of incentive to litigate in the prior action;
6) lack of a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior
action; and 7) any other reasons for unfairness to the defen-
dant.'54 A literal application of each of these factors would seem
to prevent any use of offensive issue preclusion. However, the
Court found that Parklane Hosiery had every incentive and
opportunity to litigate the issue in the SEC lawsuit since the
later private suits were foreseeable, no inconsistent decisions
were involved, and the procedural opportunities were similar in
both actions. 55 Thus, the Supreme Court permitted the use of
110 Id. at 324-25.
"' Id. at 337.
' Id. at 329-30.
'" Id. at 330-31.
See id. at 331-32.
Id. at 332. Although the defendant would have been entitled to a jury trial in
the present action on the issue of the misleading statement absent the motion for
summary judgment, Parklane Hosiery did not have a right to a jury tnal in the prior
SEC action for injunctive relief. The Court permitted the use of estoppel in the face of
1987-881
KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL
offensive collateral estoppel in federal courts and laid a foun-
dation for the application of the doctrine in states that have
abolished mutuality but have not applied collateral estoppel of-
fensively 156
3. State Cases After Parklane
Offensive collateral estoppel has been expressly adopted by
many states 157 and by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.158
An examination of two state decisions to adopt and one state
decision to reject offensive collateral estoppel provides a basis
for applying the doctrine in Kentucky 'In Hunter v City of Des
Moines, 59 the Iowa Supreme Court, after considering Parklane
and a tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments,
adopted offensive issue preclusion. 6° Unlike Kentucky, the Iowa
Court had limited non-mutual preclusion to defensive uses in a
prior decision that abolished mutuality 161 As a result, offensive
this procedural difference by calling it a "neutral" distinction. Id. at 332 n.19 ("[Tihe
presence or absence of a jury as factfinder is basically neutral, quite unlike, for example,
the necessity of defending the first lawsuit in an inconvenient forum."). Id.
116 See supra note 139.
'" See, e.g., Ali Baba Co. v. Wilco, Inc., 482 A.2d 418, 422 (D.C. 1984); Dudley
V. Carroll, 467 So. 2d 706, 707 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (refused application in this
case because of lack of opportunity to litigate, but indicated an acceptance by Florida
courts in appropriate situations); Hunter v. City of Des Moines, 300 N.W.2d 121, 125
(Iowa 1981); Kaiser v. Northern States Power Co., 353 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn. 1984);
O'Blennts, 691 S.W.2d at 503; Beall v. Doe, 315 S.E.2d 186, 190 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984);
Conley v. Spillers, 301 S.E.2d 216, 224-25, 226-27 (W Va. 1983); see also Schroeder,
supra note 9, at 919-20 ("The requirement of mutuality for both defensive and offensive
applications of issue preclusion has been abolished both in the federal courts and in most
state courts." (footnotes omitted)); Note, supra note 2, at 149-50 ("In fact, most courts
that have abandoned the mutuality rule are now willing to apply collateral estoppel both
defensively and offensively, depending upon the circumstances of each case."). But see
Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip., Inc., 443 N.E.2d 978, 982-83, 987-88 (Ohio 1983);
Algood v. Nashville Mach. Co., 648 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983).
IS RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982). No distinction is made
between offensive and defensive preclusion, but the additional protections afforded
offensive collateral estoppel in cases like Parklane are listed as additional considerations
in the Restatement. See id., see also supra note 154 and accompanying text.
159 300 N.W.2d 121 (Iowa 1981).
1 See d. at 123-25.
161 Id. at 123 (citing Betran v. Glen Falls Ins. Co., 232 N.W.2d 527, 533-34 (Iowa
1975)).
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use of estoppel was prohibited in Iowa until the Hunter deci-
sion.162
The South Carolina Court of Appeals clearly accepted of-
fensive collateral estoppel in Beall v Doe.163 However, the his-
tory of estoppel in South Carolina is similar to that in Kentucky 164
In previous cases the South Carolina Supreme Court had rejected
mutuality and applied collateral estoppel defensively, 65 yet no
appellate court had expressly prohibited an offensive use. 66 Al-
though the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals had interpreted
South Carolina law as prohibiting the use of offensive collateral
estoppel, 67 the Beall court relied upon the reasoning of prior
South Carolina cases, as well as Parklane and the Restatement,
and decided to allow its use.168 Similarly, Kentucky courts are
in a position to follow the reasoning in Sedley and other juris-
dictions and adopt the use of offensive collateral estoppel.
Conversely, the Ohio Supreme Court chose not to allow the
non-mutual use of offensive issue preclusion in Goodson v
McDonough Power Equipment Co. 169 Instead of abolishing mu-
tuality, Ohio courts have allowed issue preclusion in the absence
of identity of parties by permitting exceptions in particular
cases.1 70 In one case an injured plaintiff was allowed to bind a
defendant hospital on the issue of sovereign immunity even
though the plaintiff did not participate in the prior action.'7,
This clearly offensive use of preclusion was limited to the par-
ticular facts involved in that case. Although it refused to reject
' Id.
163 315 S.E.2d 186 (S.C. Ct. App. 1984).
'16 In both Beall and Sedley, the appellate court rejected mutuality and applied
collateral estoppel defensively without any prohibition against offensive use. See id. at
189; Sedley, 461 S.W.2d at 559. As a result, the Kentucky Supreme Court could adopt
the same reasoning as the South Carolina Supreme Court in Beall and find that the
offensive use of collateral estoppel has been permissible in Kentucky since the date of
the Sedley opinion.
,61 See id. at 189 (citing Irby v. Richardson, 298 S.E.2d 452 (S.C. 1982); Graham
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., 287 S.E.2d 495, 496 (S.C. 1982)).
' Id.
167 Id. at 189-90 (citing Watkins v. M. & M. Tank Lines, Inc., 694 F.2d 309 (4th
Cir. 1982)).
'" See id. at 190.
443 N.E.2d 978, 987 (Ohio 1983).
£70 See id. at 984-87.
17' Id. at 984-85 (citing Hicks v. De La Cruz, 369 N.E.2d 776 (Ohio 1977)).
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mutuality, the Goodson court implied that non-mutual estoppel
would be permitted in appropriate situations.172 Thus, even in a
jurisdiction that requires mutuality, such as Ohio, litigants may
not be absolutely precluded from applying offensive estoppel.
4. Supreme Court Cases After Parklane
At least three recent United States Supreme Court cases have
an impact on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In United States
v Mendoza,7 3 the Court refused to allow the non-mutual use
of offensive collateral estoppel to bind the U.S. government. 74
The Court reasoned that the government should not be placed
in the same position as a private litigant "because of the geo-
graphic breadth of Government litigation and also, most impor-
tantly, because of the nature of the issues the Government
litigates.' ' 75 Similarly, Kentucky's highest court refused to allow
preclusion against the State in Ward v Southern Bell Telephone
and Telegraph Co. 76 One of the factors the court listed in
support of their decision was the involvement of different gov-
ernment attorneys in the prior and subsequent actions. 77 Thus,
Kentucky courts may adopt the use of offensive estoppel but
they can use the protective reasoning of Mendoza and Ward to
prevent its application against the State.
In Kremer v Chemical Construction Corp. ,i78 the Court in
a Title VII action required federal courts to give the same
preclusive effect to a state judgment as given by the courts of
'7 After deciding to continue the mutuality requirement, the court stated that "[w]e
therefore opt to adhere to such principle as a general proposition, while realizing that
there may well be other cases in which there are presented additional exceptions which
could be acceptable to this court upon the basis of serving justice within the framework
of sound public policy." Id. at 987.
In addition, the court held that it "might accept the principle of the offensive use
of nonmutual preclusion as applied to product design cases." Id. However, it refused
to make such application because of a lack of identity of issues in violation of Parklane
and Restatement principles. Id. at 987-88.
'" 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
174 Id. at 162.
'" Id. at 159.
"7 436 S.W.2d 794 (Ky. 1968); see generally supra notes 119-22 and accompanying
text.
177 Ward, 436 S.W.2d at 797.
M 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
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that state. 179 This decision increases the need for state courts
to make a clear statement of preclusion principles.180 Moreover,
in the recent decision of University of Tennessee v Elliott'8'
the Court required federal courts to give the same preclusive
effect to issues determined in certain unreviewed state admin-
istrative adjudications as would the courts of that state. 82
However, within Elliott, preclusion is limited to state agencies
"acting in a judicial capacity,' '1 83 and disallowed where Con-
gress has expressed an intent to foreclose such preclusion. 8 4
Giving such broad effect to administrative decisions may lead
to greater use of preclusion based on prior administrative ad-
judications. However, in light of the different procedures in-
volved in administrative proceedings, application of offensive
collateral estoppel, in some situations, may be unfair to the
defendant.""
The experience of other jurisdictions in the application of
offensive collateral estoppel 86 can provide a basis for its ap-
plication in Kentucky This experience, added to the framework
of collateral estoppel presently available in Kentucky, can result
in a fair system for preventing unnecessary relitigation of issues.
Any lingering doubts as to the ability of courts to prevent
unjust application of the doctrine should be removed by the
examples given below
B. Requirements For Offensive Collateral Estoppel
In general, the requirements for non-mutual collateral es-
toppel in Kentucky 187 are the same as those in other jurisdic-
,9 Id. at 481-82.
'9 See supra note 17.
' 106 S. Ct. 3220 (1986).
", Id. at 3227.
183 Id.
,R4 See d. at 3225 (Congress has expressed an intent not to allow preclusion in
Title VII claims.).
In the context of a cnminal trial, Kentucky has refused to preclude issues decided
in a prior civil administrative decision. See Louisville Civil Serv. Bd. v. Blair, 711
S.W.2d 181, 183 (Ky. 1986).
,s See mfra notes 219-29 and accompanying text.
'" See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 65-95 and accompanying text.
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tions. 88 The Restatement (Second) of Judgments divides its
discussion of issue preclusion into three sections: the general
rule between the same parties,8 9 exceptions to the general rule, 190
and considerations for issue preclusion in subsequent litigation
with others.' 9' Whether called principles, factors, or corollaries,
I"' See Polk v. Montgomery County, 782 F.2d 1196, 1201 (4th Cir. 1986) (listing
five factors to consider); Ali Baba Co., 482 A.2d at 423 (four factors); Hunter, 300
N.W.2d at 123 (four prerequisites); BurtoQ & Crawford, supra note 88, at 30, 31 (three
elements); Catanis, supra note 3, at 229 (three requirements for preclusion and two
additional elements for issue preclusion); Note, supra note 2, at 145 (three corollaries).
10 § 27. Issue Preclusion-General Rule
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by
a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the
judgment, the deternunation is conclusive in a subsequent action between
the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
110 § 28. Exceptions to the General Rule of Issue Preclusion
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and
final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, reliti-
gation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not
precluded in the following circumstances:
(1) The party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a
matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action;
or
(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that
are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new determination is warranted in
order to take account of an interVing change in the applicable legal
context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws; or
(3) A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in
the quality or extensiveness of the procedures followed in the two courts
or by factors relating to the allocation of junsdiction between them; or
(4) The party against whom preclusion is sought had a significantly
heavier burden of persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action
than in the subsequent action; the burden has shifted to his adversary; or
the adversary has a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first
action; or
(5) There is a clear and convincing need for a new determination of
the issue (a) because of the potential adverse impact of the determination
on the public interest or the interests of persons not themselves parties in
the initial action, (b) because it was not sufficiently foreseeable at the time
of the initial action that the issue would arise in the context of a subsequent
action, or (c) because the party sought to be precluded, as a result of the
conduct of his adversary or other special circumstances, did not have an
adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in
the initial action.
Id. at § 28 (1982).
"I' § 29. Issue Preclusion in Subsequent Litigation With Others
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these requirements provide a format for a basic claim or de-
fense of issue preclusion. 192 An examnation of the application
of three of these requirements provides a more complete body
of law for the use of offensive collateral estoppel in Kentucky
First, the party asserting collateral estoppel has the burden
of proving the identity of the issues in the prior and subsequent
actions.193 While this requirement may be easy to meet in simple
cases, additional considerations are involved in more complex
suits between multiple parties. For example, in Bogenholm v
A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party,
in accordance with §§ 27 and 28, is also precluded from doing so with
another person unless the fact that he lacked full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in the first action or other circumstances justify affording
him an opportunity to relitigate the issue. The circumstances to which
considerations should be given include those enumerated in § 28 and also
whether:
(I) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be incompat-
ible with an applicable scheme of administenng the remedies in the actions
involved;
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party against whom
preclusion is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and
determination of the issue that were not available in the first action and
could likely result in the issue being differently determined;
(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to avoid
unfavorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action
between himself and his present adversary;
(4) The determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent
with another determination of the same issue;
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by relationships
among the parties to the first action that are not present in the subsequent
action, or apparently was based on a compromuse verdict or finding;
(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may complicate
determination of issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interests
of another party thereto;
(7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined
would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration
of the legal rule upon which it was based;
(8) Other compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the party
be permitted to relitigate the issue.
Id. at § 29 (1982).
"9 Before submitting any proof of estoppel, normally a party must assert it in the
pleadings. See Beall, 315 S.E.2d at 188 ("We agree that, as a general rule, a former
adjudication must be pled in order to make the doctrine of collateral estoppel operative
in a particular case."); see also CR 8.03 (res judicata listed as an affirmative defense).
However, the party against whom estoppel is asserted can waive the failure to plead
preclusion if no objection is made when the issue is raised. Id.
"I See Goodson, 443 N.E.2d at 983.
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House,9 4 twelve high school cheerleaders were injured when
the van in which they were riding collided with another vehi-
cle. 195 Six cheerleaders, in separate actions, sued the drivers of
both vehicles, the school district, and their faculty advisor An
agreement was made between the plaintiffs providing for one
action to proceed as a "test case'1 9 6 and for a method of
dividing the recovery of insurance proceeds between them. The
"test case" resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff against each
defendant on the negligence and causation issues. However, the
jury did not apportion any negligence to the defendant faculty
advisor 197
The action by cheerleader Judith Bogenholm then proceeded
to trial. Bogenholm attempted to bind all the defendants on
the negligence and causation issues, while the faculty advisor
attempted to bind Bogenholn on the issue of apportionment. 198
Since Bogenholm was not a party to the prior suit and had not
had her day in court, the use of estoppel against her was
rejected. 199 However, Bogenholm attempted to separate the neg-
ligence and causation issues that were favorable to her from
the apportionment issue favoring the faculty advisor Although
the issues of negligence and causation were identical in both
suits, the court refused to give Bogenholm the choice of se-
lecting what issues to apply, because this "may lead to an
inequitable and distorted result. ' ' 200 Consequently, Bogenholm
was given the option of invoking collateral estoppel on negli-
gence, causation, and apportionment or of relitigating the entire
liability issue. 20' Thus, in complex cases involving multiple par-
ties and issues the party asserting offensive estoppel may be
given the choice of precluding all identical issues or relitigating
all identical issues.
194 388 N.W.2d 402 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
19, Id. at 403.
196 Id.
'97 Id. at 404.
199 Id.
199 Id. at 407 It is a violation of due process to bind a person who was not a party
nor in pnvity with a party to the prior suit. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying
text.
. Id. at 408.
201 Id.
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Second, the proponent of estoppel must show that the issues
in the prior action were actually determined .202 When there exists
any reasonable doubt as to whether the issue has been deter-
mined, estoppel is not applied. 203 The proponent can satisfy this
requirement easily by supplying either a copy of a special verdict,
or conclusions of fact and law that specifically identify the
particular issues determined. With a general verdict, the propo-
nent may need to turn to the pleadings and the full transcript
of the prior proceeding 2°4 or present the testimony of persons
who observed the first trial 0 5 The deposition of a juror in the
prior case is an additional method of proving issues actually
determined. 20 6 It has been suggested, however, that courts should
guard against freely allowing juror depositions when other rea-
sons exist for denying the use of estoppel. 20 7
Third, the party to be bound must have had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action. The require-
ment has evolved differently in federal courts, as opposed to
state courts. In Kremer, the Supreme Court, while noting that
previous decisions had failed to define the phrase "full and fair
opportunity to litigate," required only that state proceedings
meet "the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth
202 See, e.g., Kaiser, 353 N.W.2d at 907 ("Moreover, the question of whether NSP
should be relieved of liability to the firefighters because of contributory negligence of
the firefighters was never litigated in the prior action."); Van Dyke v. Boswell, O'Toole,
Davis & Pickering, 697 S.W.2d 381, 385 (Tex. 1985) ("[S]ince we have already deter-
mined that the trial on the intervention claim for fees did not actually litigate the
malpractice issue ., it is not necessary for us to address the [collateral estoppel]
question.").
"I' See Note, supra note 2, at 154 (citing Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270 (3d
Cir. 1970) and Mulligan v. SchIachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968)).
114 See Note, supra note 2, at 152.
205 Id.
106 See generally Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D. 378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Note,
supra note 2. At least two reasons existed for the use of juror depositions in Katz. First,
since the purpose of the juror deposition was to prevent the use of collateral estoppel
in a second case, the court found that such a deposition would not literally violate the
federal rule of preventing the impeachment of a jury verdict by testimony concerning
jury deliberations. Katz, 84 F.R.D. at 382; Note, supra note 2, at 160-61. Second, when
a plaintiff attempts to use a pnor decision offensively against a common defendant, a
court should afford the defendant "every reasonable opportunity to examine the verdict
sought to be asserted against it." Note, supra note 2, at 160.
See Note, supra note 2, at 171.
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Amendment's Due Process Clause. ' 20  Although not directly
mandating states to adopt the "full and fair" requirement for
their own rules of preclusion, the Court did dictate that state
courts, at a mminmum, deny preclusive effect to prior judgments
that failed to supply procedural due process to the parties. 2
The limitation of "full and fair opportunity" to "nummum
procedural requirements" represents a narrow application of the
requirement because it focuses more upon the "opportunity" to
litigate than the actual circumstances or effectiveness of the prior
action.210
Fortunately for parties challenging the application of collat-
eral estoppel, other courts and commentators have defined "full
and fair opportunity" more broadly For many judges and schol-
ars the focus of the requirement has been on the "fairness" of
the opportunity to litigate. 2" In addition to procedural require-
ments, courts have considered such factors as the experience of
counsel, the prejudice in a particular forum, and the absence of
the losing party's counsel in the subsequent action. 212 However,
if subjective considerations such as these are given controlling
weight, the party resisting estoppel would almost always prevail.
One court recently expressed the need to "apply an objective
20, We have previously recognized that the judicially created doctrine of col-
lateral estoppel does not apply when the party against whom the earlier
decision is asserted did not have a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate
the claim or issue
Our previous decisions have not specified the source or defined the
content of the requirement that the first adjudication offer a full and fair
opportunity to litigate. But for present purposes, where we are bound by
the statutory directive of 1738, state proceedings need do no more than
satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit
guaranteed by federal law.
Kremer, 456 U.S. at 480-81 (citations and footnote omitted).
10 "The State must, however, satisfy the applicable requirements of the Due Process
Clause. A State may not grant preclusive effect in its own courts to a constitutionally
infirm judgment, and other state and federal courts are not required to accord full faith
and credit to such a judgment." Id. at 482 (footnote omitted).
210 Cf. Perschbacher, supra note 2, at 456-58.
21, "In fact, many judges and legal scholars feel that fairness is the ultimate
consideration, rather than reliance on any particular set of rules." Note, supra note 2,
at 156.
212 See id. (citing Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 246 N.E.2d 725, 729-30 (N.Y. 1969);
Read v. Sacco, 375 N.Y.S.2d 371, 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975)).
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standard in assessing the 'full and fair opportunity to litigate'
standard, ' 213 and expressly rejected the use of subjective reasons
for denying the application of collateral estoppel. 21 4
Likewise, Kremer applies an objective standard of "fairness"
when dealing with procedural requirements. 21 5 Logically, a mid-
dle-ground approach would give controlling weight to the objec-
tive procedural opportunities of the party to litigate the issue in
the prior action, as well as due consideration to subjective "fair-
ness" factors. Of course, Kremer does not mandate the use of
a narrow approach for state courts or for federal courts as to
prior federal court judgments. 216 Therefore, should Kentucky
courts adopt the offensive use of collateral estoppel they may
require a full and fair opportunity to litigate determined by the
objective procedural opportunities in the prior action and pro-
vide that some weight be given subjective reasons for unfairness.
C. Exceptions to the Use of Offensive Collateral Estoppel
As shown by the eight considerations for the application of
non-mutual preclusion listed in the Restatement 217 and the seven
limiting factors given in Parklane,218 many exceptions to the
application of offensive collateral estoppel are recognized. An
examination of three exceptions typifies how parties can prevent
the unfair application of issue preclusion.
First, parties opposing the application of offensive estoppel
may claim that the procedures were different and less fair in the
prior action.219 In City of Cleveland v Cleveland Electric Illu-
minating Co.220 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's
213 State ex rel. O'Blennis, 691 S.W.2d at 501.
234 See id. at 502-03.
21 See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
2,6 Kremer involved 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and the effect of a state court judgment on
a federal court. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 463. The definition of "full and fair opportunity"
was not applicable to state courts or to federal courts as to federal court judgments. Id.
However, the Court required all courts to deny preclusive effect to a pnor judgment
that failed to afford the bound party with the mimmum procedural requirements of due
process. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
237 See supra note 191.
238 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
"I See Ali Baba Co., 482 A.2d at 424-25; City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Il-
luminating Co., 734 F.2d 1157, 1165-66 (6th Cir. 1984).
734 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1984).
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refusal to apply collateral estoppel. The prior action involved an
administrative licensing hearing before the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC)21 in which findings of fact were made
concerning the effect of granting a license on the creation or
continuation of antitrust violations.m In the subsequent antitrust
action, the plaintiff attempted to use these findings offensively
to bind the defendant. However, the different procedures and
burdens of proof in the administrative action, plus the NRC's
lack of expertise in antitrust matters justified the trial court's
discretionary denial of preclusion.2 3
However, in Ali Baba Company, Inc. v WILCO, Inc.,2-4
the plaintiff, Ali Baba, sued the defendant, WILCO, to recover
the deficiency on a note following the foreclosure and sale of
certain rental property 225 WILCO raised various defenses, in-
cluding the wrongful substitution of trustees, usurious loan, and
unlawful lending. Ali Baba then sought to collaterally estop
WILCO from asserting these defenses since they had proven
unsuccessful against another party in the Landlord and Tenant
Branch. WILCO resisted the use of estoppel, claiming that the
procedures in the Landlord and Tenant Branch were different
and less fair than the procedures in the Civil Division. In par-
ticular, WILCO complained of the "expedited calendering pro-
cedures of the Landlord and Tenant Branch '' 2 6 which allowed
only one month to prepare a response to the opposing party's
summary judgment motion. 227
Although the procedures in the Landlord and Tenant Branch
were "substantially curtailed"'' 8 to allow for speedy and expe-
ditious proceedings, the court refused to deny the use of estoppel
because of WILCO's failure to take advantage of other proce-
dural opportunities. Under District of Columbia law, WILCO
was entitled to have the case removed to the Civil Division
because of a prior plea of title, but WILCO failed to object
121 See id. at 1165-66.
222 Id. at 1164.
22 Id. at 1165-66.
482 A.2d 418 (D.C. 1984).
- Id. at 420.
'2 Id. at 425.
= Id.
=2 Id. at 424.
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when the case was not removed. 229 In addition, at the hearing
on the summary judgment motion, WILCO did not ask for a
continuance or reconsideration and did not take the opportunity
to argue the case on the merits.
A second exception to the application of offensive estoppel
is applied when the proponent, usually the plaintiff, could have
easily joined in the first action. 2 0 The plaintiff in Polk v Mont-
gomery County231 filed suit against various government entities
and employees alleging an unlawful strip search. 232 Shortly there-
after, another plaintiff, Smith, filed a class action suit involving
the same type of strip search. Polk admitted that she qualified
as a class member in the Smith action, but refused to join the
class. After the Smith case was decided, Polk moved for sum-
mary judgment on the issue of the constitutionality of the strip
search, and the trial court granted the motion. On appeal, the
court denied estoppel, stating that "[t]o permit a plaintiff who
declines to join a class action to later apply collateral
estoppel to a prior favorable judgment rendered in the class suit
could burden the defendants with multiple suits and may be
contrary to the notion of promoting judicial efficiency "233 Other
courts have also used failure to join as a reason for denying
preclusion. 23 4 As a result, a potential plaintiff who delays action
until another plaintiff has obtained a favorable decision against
a common defendant must have a good reason for failing to
join in the first action before the use of offensive estoppel will
be permitted.
A third exception to the offensive use of preclusion was
applied in Setter v A.H. Robins Co.,235 one of the many prod-
ucts liability actions involving the Dalkon Shield. At the time of
the Setter decision, twenty-one cases had resulted in eight deci-
sions for plaintiffs, twelve decisions for the defendant, A.H.
"' Id. at 421 n.4, 425.
230 See Polk, 782 F.2d at 1202; Hunter, 300 N.W.2d at 126; Kaiser, 353 N.W.2d
at 907.
23 782 F.2d 1196 (4th Cir. 1986).
2 Id. at 1197.
:" Id. at 1202.
"' See Hunter, 300 N.W.2d at 127; Kaiser, 353 N.W.2d at 907
"' 748 F.2d 1328 (8th Cir. 1984).
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Robins, and one hung jury 236 Setter moved for summary judg-
ment to prevent relitigation of the negligence and design defect
issues based on a recent Dalkon Shield verdict for the plaintiff
in the same court. However, the court refused to allow the use
of offensive collateral estoppel primarily because of the existence
of prior inconsistent verdicts. 2 7 If there had been only one prior
case, "a different question would have been presented.' '238
CONCLUSION
As a device for preventing the relitigation of issues decided
against a prior losing litigant, offensive collateral estoppel stands
as a deadly weapon that may be wielded by a later plaintiff
against an unlucky defendant. A simple mistake in one case can
develop into a fatal error in later cases. Because a defendant
can lose a suit due to the misstatement of a witness, an appeal
to the sympathy of a jury, or other reason unrelated to the facts
of the case, he or she can become forever bound on major
issues. Whenever a defendant faces multiple lawsuits on identical
issues, the first action demands almost perfect litigation.
On the other hand, a plaintiff may discover that his deadly
weapon is only a paper tiger. After all the requirements for the
application of collateral estoppel are met, preclusion may be
denied because of the plaintiff's failure to join in a prior action
or because the prior decision was a general verdict and the issues
essential to the verdict cannot be identified. Even if no specific
exceptions are applicable, the trial court may exercise its discre-
tion in applying general principles of fairness to deny preclusion.
In simple cases involving a limited number of parties and
readily identifiable issues, offensive collateral estoppel can be a
deadly weapon. However, in complex actions between multiple
parties, offensive preclusion more closely resembles a paper tiger;
the requirements are more difficult to satisfy and the exceptions
are easier to find. A defendant facing multiple plaintiffs should
be aware of the implications of a loss in the first case. A
36 Setter, 748 F.2d at 1330.
237 Id.
238 Id.
[VOL. 76
OFFENSIVE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
potential plaintiff who waits for a defendant to lose should not
presume that estoppel is automatically available.
After Sedley, the use of offensive, non-mutual collateral
estoppel in Kentucky became a possibility Kentucky courts can
prevent any unjust application of the doctrine by adopting the
additional protections recognized by Parklane239 and the Re-
statement (Second) of Judgments.24 The use of requirements and
exceptions to the application of offensive preclusion can insure
an equitable result. The Kentucky Supreme Court has rejected
mutuality and has not limited the application of collateral estop-
pel to defensive situations. Thus, the door is open for the use
of offensive collateral estoppel in Kentucky 241
Howard E. Frasier, Jr
239 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
24 See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
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